The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to Prevail in a Systemic Challenge to an Indigent Defense System by Hanlon, Stephen F.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 61 
Number 4 Indigence and the Criminal Justice 
System (Summer 2017) 
Article 4 
2017 
The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to Prevail in a Systemic 
Challenge to an Indigent Defense System 
Stephen F. Hanlon 
shanlondc@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen F. Hanlon, The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to Prevail in a Systemic Challenge to an 
Indigent Defense System, 61 St. Louis U. L.J. (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol61/iss4/4 
This Childress Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
625 
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD REQUIRED TO PREVAIL 
IN A SYSTEMIC CHALLENGE TO AN INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEM 
STEPHEN F. HANLON* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the appropriate legal 
standard for systemic challenges to state or local indigent defense systems. 
One federal circuit court of appeals has ruled.1 Since 2010, at least four state 
supreme courts, one state appellate court, and one federal district court have 
considered this question.2 The United States Department of Justice filed a 
Statement of Interest in the federal district court case and has filed an amicus 
brief in two systemic challenges to state indigent defense systems.3 There are 
several pending systemic challenges to state indigent defense systems around 
 
* General Counsel, National Association for Public Defense, www.publicdefenders.us, a national 
organization of more than 15,000 public defenders and other public defense officials. Mr. Hanlon 
also serves as the American Bar Association’s Project Director for the public defender workload 
studies described herein. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Practice at Saint Louis University 
School of Law. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the review and editing of this 
article by Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus of the Indiana University 
Robert H. McKinney School of Law; Margaret Winter, former Associate Director of the ACLU 
National Prison Project; Roger L. Goldman, Callis Family Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint 
Louis University School of Law; Malia Brink, Assistant Counsel for Public Defense, Standing 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, American Bar Association; and Maureen 
Hanlon (no known relation to the author), a law student at Saint Louis University School of Law. 
The views expressed herein are those of the author himself, and all errors of judgment or 
otherwise are his and his alone. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation for its support of his work in Louisiana referred to below, which was the 
catalyst for this article. Again, the views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the 
Foundation. 
 1. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, Luckey 
v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 674 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 2. Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123–24 (W.D. Wash. 2013); 
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219–20 (N.Y. 2010); State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 
597–98 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); Pub. Def., 11th Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 
265 (Fla. 2013); Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 717–18 (Pa. 2016); Duncan v. State, 774 
N.W.2d 89, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
 3. See Court Filings in Support of Access to Justice, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, www.justice. 
gov/atj/court-filings-support-access-justice [http://perma.cc/6UK4-UEZ6]. 
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the country and more are contemplated.4 This article will examine the various 
ways in which the courts have addressed this question, particularly since 2010. 
Section I of this article is a review of the major cases since 2010 that 
involve systemic challenges to indigent defense systems, either by classes of 
indigent defendants or by their attorneys, or both, seeking prospective 
injunctive relief pre-trial.5 Section II analyzes and critiques those cases. 
Section III addresses class certification concerns after the Supreme Court’s 
2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.6 Section IV articulates the argument for a 
risk-based claim that asserts systemic Sixth Amendment violations. Section V 
addresses the “dismiss and release” portion of the remedy urged here. And 
finally, Section VI concludes with a recommendation for future Sixth 
Amendment systemic challenges to state and local indigent defense systems. 
I.  THE MAJOR CASES 
A. Cronic and Strickland 
Strickland and Cronic were decided on the same day—May 14, 1984. 
Neither Strickland nor Cronic involved pre-trial claims for prospective 
injunctive relief for systemic violations of the Sixth Amendment. Rather, both 
cases involved post-conviction attempts by individual defendants seeking to 
overturn their convictions based on claims of actual ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
1. United States v. Cronic 
A young lawyer with a real estate practice was appointed to represent a 
defendant charged with mail fraud in a check kiting scheme that involved over 
$9,400,000 in checks moving between banks in Tampa, Florida and Norman, 
Oklahoma during a four-month period in 1975.7 The court gave the young 
lawyer only twenty-five days to prepare for trial, even though it had taken the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Phillips v. California, No. 15-CE-CG-02201 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 14, 2015); 
Tucker v. Idaho, No. CV-OC-2015-10240 (Idaho Dist. Ct.), appeal docketed, No. 43922-2016 
(Idaho Jan. 25, 2016); Joseph Allen v. John Bel Edwards, No. C655079 (La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 
2017); Church v. Missouri, No. 17AC-CC00130 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2017). 
 5. Pre-trial claims are ones asserted prospectively by the class plaintiffs (indigent criminal 
defendants) before trial has commenced in their criminal cases. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017. This is 
opposed to the kind of claim asserted by an individual plaintiff in a case like Strickland v. 
Washington, which was a claim asserted by an individual defendant post-trial, in a retrospective 
attempt to overturn a guilty verdict. 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984). 
 6. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 7. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649 (1983); United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 
1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982). A specific listing of the attorney’s experience in criminal law is not 
in the record, but this defense was “at best his second venture into that field.” Cronic, 675 F.2d at 
1128. 
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government over four and one-half years to investigate the case.8 The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on Sixth Amendment 
grounds,9 but made no determination of whether counsel’s actual performance 
had prejudiced the defense.10 Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that no such 
showing is necessary “when circumstances hamper a given lawyer’s 
preparation of a defendant’s case.”11 
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit because there had been no 
finding that there had been an actual breakdown of the adversarial process 
during the trial.12 In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]here are 
. . . circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of 
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”13 Justice Stevens, 
writing for a unanimous court, also famously observed, “The right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the 
prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”14 
The Court identified two kinds of cases when no specific finding of 
prejudice is required.15 First and most obvious is the complete denial of 
counsel.16 Second, “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to 
meaningful adversarial testing, then . . . the adversary process itself [is] 
presumptively unreliable” and no specific showing of prejudice is required.17 
This kind of denial of counsel has come to be known as constructive denial of 
counsel.18 Because Cronic’s case was not one where the circumstances led to 
this presumption, he would need to point out specific errors by trial counsel to 
succeed on his claim, and the Supreme Court remanded to the Tenth Circuit to 
examine that issue accordingly.19 
 
 8. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1129. 
 9. Id. at 1130. 
 10. Id. at 1128. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. 
 13. Id. at 658. 
 14. Id. at 656. 
 15. Id. at 659. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
 18. Constructive is used to define a reality, “declared such by judicial construction or 
interpretation.” Constructive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
constructive [http://perma.cc/8NYF-AUJP]. However, Strickland seems to reserve that term for 
claims that involve state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). 
 19. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666–67. After remand, the Tenth Circuit found the defendant was 
denied effective assistance of counsel and a new trial was ordered. United States v. Cronic, 839 
F.2d 1401, 1404 (10th Cir. 1988). After a new trial and appeal, Cronic’s sentence was vacated 
after finding the evidence against him was legally insufficient to prove mail fraud. United States 
v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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2. Strickland v. Washington 
Charles Strickland pled guilty to three capital murder charges.20 
Strickland’s lawyer decided not to look for or put on evidence of Strickland’s 
character or mental state.21 Instead his lawyer relied on Strickland’s admission 
of guilt and the trial judge’s remarks at the plea colloquy.22 The lawyer 
reasoned that this strategy would prevent the state from introducing psychiatric 
evidence of its own.23 
The trial judge sentenced Strickland to death.24 Strickland sought collateral 
review in the state courts on the grounds that his lawyer was ineffective.25 The 
trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
relief.26 Strickland then filed a habeas petition in federal district court.27 
After the federal district court denied habeas relief on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
sentence, sustaining the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, using a 
“reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances” test, 
and outlining standards for determining whether defense counsel fulfilled the 
duty to investigate and whether counsel’s errors were prejudicial.28 This case 
gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to consider the appropriate standards 
for adjudicating post-trial claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel.29 Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority, succinctly stated the question presented: 
The petition presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not 
previously considered in any generality. The Court has considered Sixth 
Amendment claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of 
counsel altogether, as well as claims based on state interference with the ability 
of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused. . . . [T]he Court has 
never directly and fully addressed a claim of “actual ineffectiveness” of 
counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.30 
As would be apparent later in the opinion, that last phrase should probably 
have read, “in a case that has already gone to trial.” 
 
 20. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 21. Id. at 1247–48. 
 22. Id. at 1247. 
 23. Id. at 1248 n.4. 
 24. Id. at 1247. 
 25. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1247–48. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1248–49. 
 28. Id. at 1250–63. 
 29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). 
 30. Id. at 683 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 648 (1983)). 
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So, the Supreme Court recognized three distinct kinds of claims for 
individual post-trial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel seeking to 
overturn convictions31: 
• Claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of 
counsel altogether;32 
• Claims based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render 
effective assistance to the accused;33 
• Claims based on “actual ineffectiveness” of counsel.34 
Turning to the third kind of claim it had identified, “actual 
ineffectiveness,” the Court acknowledged that it had already recognized that 
“the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”35 The 
Court then held that “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms[,]” citing the 
“[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in . . . [the] ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice . . . (‘The Defense Function’).”36 The Court specifically cited 
the ABA Standards as guides for courts to determine what is reasonable 
behavior by counsel, and disclaimed any other set of detailed rules as 
appropriate for this task.37 The Court ultimately endorsed the “reasonably 
effective assistance” performance standard that had been previously adopted 
by all federal courts of appeals.38 
Turning to the question of prejudice, the Court noted that in certain Sixth 
Amendment contexts, namely, “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance 
of counsel altogether[,]” prejudice is presumed.39 The Court reiterated Cronic 
in holding prejudice should also be presumed in various kinds of state 
interference with counsel’s assistance when prejudice is so likely that “case-
 
 31. Each of these claims is jurisdictionally distinct. Each has separate elements; each has 
separate proof; each has separate remedies. Each must be separately and critically analyzed. 
Finally, each has radically different practical consequences in terms of structuring systemic 
litigation designed to provide actual systemic reform on the ground. I analyze them here because 
when and if the Supreme Court decides to articulate the appropriate standard for a Sixth 
Amendment challenge to a large indigent defense system, it will likely look to Strickland and its 
progeny for guidance. 
 32. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
 33. Id. This article will not address potential litigation based on this claim except to note 
there may be great potential in any state that has systematically underfunded its indigent defense 
system. Future examination could conceptualize a constructive interference claim; i.e., state 
interference by persistent failure to fund, impairing the court’s ability to function, declared as 
such by judicial construction or interpretation. 
 34. Id. at 693. 
 35. Id. at 686 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). 
 36. Id. at 688 (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980)). 
 37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89. 
 38. Id. at 683. 
 39. Id. at 692. 
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by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.”40 The Court then held that 
a showing of prejudice is required in claims like the one in Strickland where an 
individual makes a post-conviction claim that his conviction should be 
overturned because of his lawyer’s actual ineffectiveness.41 
B. Lower Court Cases Following Strickland and Cronic 
1. Luckey v. Harris 
As noted above, no Supreme Court case has ever addressed the standard to 
prevail in a class action brought pre-trial by a class of indigent accused persons 
and attorneys representing them, seeking prospective Sixth Amendment 
injunctive relief for actual ineffectiveness. The only federal court of appeals 
case that has done so is Luckey v. Harris.42 This case was appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit from an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6).43 
Luckey was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action brought against state officials 
on behalf of a bilateral class consisting of all indigent persons then charged or 
who would in the future be charged with criminal offenses in Georgia and all 
attorneys who then represented or who would in the future represent indigent 
defendants.44 The Luckey plaintiffs sought “an across-the-board ruling that the 
Georgia criminal defense scheme systematically denies or will deny in the 
future effective assistance of counsel to the indigent accused.”45 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the actual ineffectiveness standard from 
Strickland, holding the two-pronged performance and prejudice standard was 
“inappropriate” for a civil suit seeking prospective relief.46 Discussing the 
needs of a civil suit, the court went on to hold: 
The sixth amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. 
Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the ‘ineffectiveness’ standard may 
nonetheless violate a defendant’s rights under the sixth amendment. In the 
post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harmless because they did not 
affect the outcome of the trial. Whether an accused has been prejudiced by the 
denial of a right is an issue that relates to relief—whether the defendant is 
 
 40. Id. The Court specifically cites to examples in Cronic of state interference in individual 
post-conviction cases seeking to overturn convictions. Id. (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 658 (1983)). 
 41. Id. at 693. 
 42. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, Luckey v. 
Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 43. Id. at 1013. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1016 (emphasis in original). 
 46. Id. at 1017. 
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entitled to have his or her conviction overturned—rather than to the question of 
whether such a right exists and can be protected prospectively.47 
The court held the “powerful considerations” justifying the Strickland 
prejudice prong in a post-conviction actual ineffectiveness case do not apply in 
prospective relief cases.48 Deferential scrutiny of counsel’s performance is 
appropriate in such a case based on concerns for finality, concern that 
extensive post-trial burdens would discourage counsel from accepting cases, 
and concern for the independence of counsel.49 
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the relief sought in a case seeking 
injunctive relief from those previously brought in post-trial claims seeking to 
overturn a conviction: 
Prospective relief is designed to avoid future harm. Therefore, it can protect 
constitutional rights, even if the violation of these rights would not affect the 
outcome of the trial. . . . 
In a suit for prospective relief the plaintiff’s burden is to show “the likelihood 
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of 
remedies at law.” . . . This is the standard to which appellants, as a class, 
should have been held.50 
The Eleventh Circuit then described the kinds of claims that the class had 
alleged in their complaint, including systemic delays in the appointment of 
counsel that denied them their Sixth Amendment right to counsel at critical 
stages in the criminal process, pressure by the courts to hurry their case to trial 
or enter a guilty plea, and denial of investigative and expert resources 
“necessary to defend them effectively.”51 The court thus reversed the motion to 
dismiss and concluded that these allegations were sufficient to state a viable 
claim of a denial of Sixth Amendment rights.52 
The Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of O’Shea v. Littleton’s “likelihood of 
substantial and immediate irreparable injury” test is what I call a risk-based 
test throughout the rest of this article.53 This is to distinguish this test from the 
performance-based test that Luckey and, as we shall see, Hurrell-Harring 
rejected. 
 
 47. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1017–18 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974) (emphasis 
added)). 
 51. Id. at 1018 (emphasis added). 
 52. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1018. 
 53. Id. at 1017–18. 
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2. Hurrell-Harring v. State 
Like Luckey, Hurrell-Harring v. State dealt with a putative class action by 
individual criminal defendants seeking prospective injunctive relief for 
systemic Sixth Amendment violations in five counties in upstate New York.54 
The case came before the New York Court of Appeals after the state appealed 
the denial of its motion to dismiss.55 Plaintiffs in this case were indigent 
defendants with ongoing criminal prosecutions represented by defense systems 
in five counties in upstate New York.56 
The plaintiffs’ claim, as interpreted by the intermediate appellate court 
ruling under review, was that the state’s public defense system was 
“systematically deficient and presents a grave and unacceptable risk that 
indigent criminal defendants are being or will be denied their constitutional 
right to meaningful and effective assistance of counsel.”57 So stated, the claim 
appeared to adopt Luckey’s admonition that in a suit for prospective injunctive 
relief, the plaintiffs’ burden is to show the likelihood of substantial and 
immediate irreparable injury.58 
But the New York Court of Appeals ignored Luckey and ignored the risk-
based nature of the plaintiffs’ claim. Rather, it accepted the defendants’ 
argument that the plaintiffs’ claim was simply a performance-based two-
pronged Strickland claim asserting both failure of performance and 
prejudice.59 Such a claim, the court believed, was “necessarily rooted in the 
particular circumstances of an individual case [and] cannot serve as a predicate 
for systemic relief.”60 Having so characterized the plaintiffs’ claim, the court 
majority wasted little time deciding that there were inherent problems in such a 
systemic challenge.61 
Then, as the dissent accurately noted, the court read a constructive denial 
of counsel claim into the complaint, focusing on some of the factual allegations 
about individual plaintiffs in the complaint who either had no counsel at all 
(what the court majority called “nonrepresentation”) or had counsel who, 
although nominally appointed, were unavailable to their clients (what I call 
“nominal” representation).62 
 
 54. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219 (N.Y. 2010). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. The counties at issue were Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuyler, and Suffolk 
counties. Id. 
 57. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 58. See Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017–18. 
 59. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 221. 
 60. Id. at 220. 
 61. Id. at 221. 
 62. Id. at 222. The dissent takes issue with the majority’s insertion of a constructive denial 
claim, arguing, “Plaintiffs’ mere lumping together of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel 
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The Hurrell-Harring court was quite clear about what issues were before 
the court, finding that “[t]he questions properly raised in this Sixth 
Amendment-grounded action, we think, go not to whether ineffectiveness has 
assumed systemic dimensions, but rather to whether the State has met its 
foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal representation.”63 The 
majority then found that the claims in this case were in the latter category.64 
The court could not have been clearer on this point: “[T]he complaint states a 
claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel by reason of insufficient 
compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.”65 And again: “These 
allegations state a claim, not for ineffective assistance under Strickland, but for 
basic denial of the right to counsel under Gideon.”66 
3. Duncan v. State 
In Duncan v. State, a putative class of indigent criminal defendants subject 
to felony convictions in three Michigan counties brought this case in state 
court under 42 U.S.C § 1983, asserting that the indigent defense systems in 
those counties were constitutionally deficient due to inadequate funding and 
lack of fiscal and administrative oversight.67 The trial court granted class 
certification and denied the state’s motion for summary disposition of the 
claim, and the state appealed.68 The Michigan appeals court held that based on 
the pleadings before it the plaintiffs stated viable claims for relief and upheld 
the trial court’s class certification ruling.69 
Further, the court held that in this class action challenge to the 
constitutionality of these three indigent defense systems the plaintiffs’ burden 
was two-fold.70 First, plaintiffs must show that “counsel’s representation falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to a critical stage in 
the proceedings.”71 Second, plaintiffs must show that instances of deficient 
performance and denial of counsel are widespread and systemic and that they 
 
claims into one civil pleading does not ipso facto transform it into one alleging a systemic denial 
of the right to counsel.” Id. at 230 (Pigott, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 221–22 (emphasis added). 
 64. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224. 
 65. Id. at 225. 
 66. Id. at 224. 
 67. 774 N.W.2d 89, 97, 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
 68. Id. at 97. 
 69. Id. at 145. 
 70. Id. at 123–24. 
 71. Id. at 123. The court further noted, “[S]imply being deprived of the constitutional right to 
effective representation at a critical stage in the proceedings, in and of itself, gives rise to harm.” 
Id. at 127. 
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are caused by weaknesses and problems in the three indigent defense systems 
involved in the case.72 
The court left it to the trial court to determine “the parameters of what 
constitutes ‘widespread,’ ‘systemic,’ or ‘pervasive’ constitutional violations or 
harm.”73 The court further held the trial court on remand would need to 
consider the degree of harm shown, “giving more weight to instances of 
deficient performance that resulted in unreliable verdicts and instances where 
the right to counsel was denied, with less weight being given where there is 
mere deficient performance.”74 The court further noted that the plaintiffs “will 
no doubt have a heavy burden to prove and establish their case” at trial.75 
The court relied on Luckey for the proposition that the two-pronged 
Strickland standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief 
but did not formulate its test as a risk-based test.76 The court upheld the trial 
court’s ruling on class certification, noting that “[b]ecause there is limited case 
law in Michigan addressing class certifications, this Court may refer to federal 
cases construing the federal rules on class certification.”77 
4. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State 
In this Florida case, a public defender filed a motion to be relieved of 
appointments to represent indigent defendants in noncapital felony cases, 
claiming excessive caseloads caused by underfunding created a widespread 
problem as to effective representation.78 The trial court granted relief, but the 
intermediate appellate court reversed.79 The Florida Supreme Court sided with 
the trial court and held that given the massive evidentiary showing made by the 
public defender, relief from excessive caseloads was appropriate, and 
remanded the case to the trial court to determine if current circumstances 
warranted relief (after five years of litigation).80 No relief was subsequently 
sought.81 
The court used a risk-based standard contained in the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar to decide the case.82 A Florida statute provided that when a public 
defender’s basis for withdrawal is a conflict of interest (due to excessive 
caseloads or otherwise), the court could only permit withdrawal if it found that 
 
 72. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 124. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 128–29. 
 77. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 138. 
 78. Pub. Def., 11th Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 2013). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 283. 
 81. The author confirmed this fact with Miami Public Defender Carlos Martinez. 
 82. Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 279 (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2)). 
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the conflict was prejudicial.83 The court held that under the statute, the 
prejudice required for withdrawal in a case involving excessive caseloads was 
a showing of a “substantial risk that [the] representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” 
citing the Florida Rule identical to ABA Model Rule 1.7(a)(2).84 The Florida 
standard is very similar to the risk-based standard for systemic Sixth 
Amendment violations that I argue for in this article.85 
The Florida Supreme Court drew on Luckey and carefully distinguished the 
performance-based claim that Luckey rejected and the risk-based claim for 
systemic Sixth Amendment violations that Luckey presaged.86 The court also 
opined that the case before it had “very similar circumstances” to those 
presented in the Hurrell-Harring case87 and concluded that “the circumstances 
presented here involve some measure of non-representation and therefore a 
denial of the actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by Gideon and the Sixth 
Amendment.”88 
5. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon 
This was a class action originally brought in a state court and removed to 
federal court by the defendants.89 The plaintiffs were indigent criminal 
defendants who sought prospective injunctive relief against two small 
municipalities in Washington state, asserting a constructive denial claim 
similar to the claim identified by the Hurrell-Harring court.90 The plaintiffs 
argued that Gideon, not Strickland, provided the proper standard for the case.91 
The case required the trial judge to analyze the workloads and performance 
of four lawyers in two small municipalities in the State of Washington.92 The 
court found that that “the public defense system [had] systemic flaws;” that the 
defenders “represent[ed] the client in name only in these circumstances;” and 
that “[s]uch perfunctory ‘representation’ does not satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment,” citing Hurrell-Harring’s finding that such failures to 
communicate or appear at critical stages, may be reasonably interpreted as 
 
 83. Id. at 275. 
 84. Id. (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2)). This is the same risk-based Rules of 
Professional Responsibility claim that I set out in Section IV. 
 85. See infra Section IV. 
 86. Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 276–77. 
 87. Id. at 277. 
 88. Id. at 278. 
 89. Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
 90. Id. at 1124. 
 91. Id. at 1127. 
 92. Id. at 1124–28. 
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nonrepresentation rather than ineffective representation.93 The court found that 
the plaintiffs had proven a systemic deprivation of the right to the assistance of 
counsel.94 The court granted injunctive relief that, among other things, ordered 
the defendants to hire a part-time “Public Defense Supervisor” to work at least 
twenty hours per week to supervise and evaluate the performance of these four 
lawyers, to collect and analyze data regarding their performance, and to submit 
bi-annual reports to the parties and the court.95 The Luckey decision is not cited 
in this case. 
6. State v. Waters96 
The Missouri Public Defender promulgated a rule providing for 
certification of unavailability once a district defender’s office exceeded the 
established caseload maximums. Those maximums had been established by a 
rule it had promulgated and a protocol it had developed and incorporated in the 
rule.97 A district defender office with caseloads that exceeded those maximums 
moved in a criminal court to be relieved of further representation of clients, 
asserting claims under the rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the 
Sixth Amendment.98 The trial judge did not question that the district 
defender’s office had an excessive caseload, but the court nonetheless ordered 
the district defender office to continue its representation of new eligible 
indigent defendants.99 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court, as requested by 
the Missouri Public Defender, ordered the trial court to vacate that order, 
finding that the trial court had exceeded its authority by appointing the public 
defender to represent a defendant in contravention of the Rules of Professional 
 
 93. Id. at 1131–32. The facts in this case (e.g., the trial court’s observation that 
“representation . . . remains inadequate” and the trial court’s concern about lack of 
“representational relationship”) actually appear to constitute what I call “nominal representation.” 
Id. at 1128. 
 94. Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. 
 95. Id. at 1134–37. 
 96. The author was lead counsel for the Missouri Public Defender in Waters. 
 97. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). Public defender offices in 
Missouri operate under the control of the public defender commission, which is vested with 
corresponding powers necessary and convenient to providing representation to indigent 
defendants. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.015–600.101 (2016). The commission is thus authorized to 
“[m]ake any rules needed for the administration of the state public defender system.” MO. REV. 
STAT. § 600.017(10) (2016). The rule at issue provides that once a district office exceeds the 
maximum caseload standard for three consecutive calendar months, “‘the director may limit the 
office’s availability to accept additional cases by filing a certification of limited availability’ with 
the appropriate court.” Waters, 370 S.W.3d. at 599. 
 98. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 597. 
 99. Id. at 601. 
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Conduct, the Sixth Amendment, and the Missouri Public Defender’s caseload 
maximum rule.100 
In analyzing the public defender’s Strickland claim, the court noted the 
Supreme Court’s admonition in Kimmelman v. Morrison that “the right to 
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.”101 “Moreover,” the 
Waters court noted, “this right is affirmative and prospective.”102 
The court saw the central issues as (1) the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding, and (2) the ethical 
obligation of counsel not to accept work if counsel does not believe he or she 
can perform competently.103 Relying on Missouri v. Frye,104 the court held: 
The constitutional right to effective counsel applies to all critical stages of the 
proceeding; it is a prospective right to have counsel’s advice during the 
proceeding and is not merely a retrospective right to have a verdict or plea set 
aside if one can prove that the absence of competent counsel affected the 
proceeding. 
Simply put, a judge may not appoint counsel when the judge is aware that, for 
whatever reason, counsel is unable to provide effective representation to a 
defendant. Effective, not just pro forma, representation is required by the 
Missouri and federal constitutions.105 
Turning to the Rules of Professional Conduct claim, the court applied the 
Rule 1.7 test to determine whether excessive caseloads produce a “significant 
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by 
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.”106 Relying on a similar case 
from California,107 the court found that “a conflict of interest is inevitably 
created when a public defender is compelled by his or her excessive caseload 
to choose between the rights of the various indigent defendants he or she is 
representing.”108 
Turning finally to the Missouri Public Defender Commission’s maximum 
caseload rule, the court held the rule valid and specifically noted that it was 
with the above constitutional and ethical rights and obligations in mind that the 
 
 100. Id. at 607. 
 101. Id. at 606 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 607. 
 104. 566 U.S. 133 (2012). 
 105. Id. (citations omitted). 
 106. Id. (citing Rule 4-1.7(a)(2)). 
 107. In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725, 746–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 108. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 608. Interestingly, the court found that “while the ethical rules do 
not supplant ‘a trial judge’s obligation to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights,’ they do 
‘run parallel to’ that duty.” Id. 
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Commission enacted the maximum caseload rule.109 The court found that no 
infirmity with the rule had been established under state law, and thus the trial 
judge exceeded his authority by appointing the public defender in violation of 
that rule.110 
No claim of constructive denial of counsel was asserted in this case.111 In 
the briefs and at oral argument, the Missouri Public Defender urged the court 
to apply the risk-based Luckey test of likelihood of substantial and immediate 
irreparable injury, but the court did not cite to or rely on Luckey in its 
opinion.112 
Waters stands for the proposition that when a statewide public defender 
office can demonstrate that it has so many cases that its lawyers cannot provide 
competent and effective representation to all of their clients, lawyers may 
refuse additional appointments and judges may not appoint them to represent 
additional indigent defendants.113 When that occurs, judges should prioritize 
cases on their dockets in the interest of public safety, so that the most serious 
cases are assigned to public defenders, and if no competent public defender can 
be found to represent those charged with less serious crimes, those cases 
should be dismissed.114 Moreover, if the defendants in such cases are in 
custody, they should be released.115 
7. Kuren v. Luzerne County 
This was a class action case filed in a state court by the Luzerne County 
Public Defender and his clients under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting 
constitutional claims based on the inability to provide competent legal 
representation due to inadequate funding.116 The trial court found that the 
plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action for mandamus or a constitutional 
violation.117 An intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.118 
The case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.119 
The United States Department of Justice filed an amicus brief asserting 
that a claim for constructive denial of counsel is cognizable under the Sixth 
 
 109. Id. at 612. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See generally State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 112. Brief for Petitioner at 40–41, 47, State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
(No. SC91150), 2011 WL 5118554, at *40–41, *47. 
 113. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 607. 
 114. Id. at 611. 
 115. Id. at 611–12. 
 116. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 718, 720 (Pa. 2016). 
 117. Id. at 726. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 729. 
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Amendment.120 Prospective injunctive relief for such a claim is viable, and the 
DOJ argued: 
(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of representation—
such as timely and confidential consultation with clients, appropriate 
investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—
are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when substantial structural 
limitations—such as a severe lack of resources, unreasonably high workloads, 
or critical staffing of public defender offices—cause that absence or limitation 
on representation.121 
The DOJ argued that “when the totality of the circumstances indicate[s] . . . a 
system-wide problem of nonrepresentation,” i.e., the appointment of counsel is 
merely cosmetic and the defendant has a lawyer in name only, prospective 
relief must be available.122 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied upon and extensively analyzed 
Luckey, Duncan, and Hurrell-Harring, finding all three cases to be 
“persuasive, indeed, compelling.”123 The court held that “there is a cognizable 
cause of action whereby a class of indigent defendants may seek relief for a 
widespread, systematic and constructive denial of counsel when alleged 
deficiencies in funding and resources provided by the county deny indigent 
defendants their constitutional right to counsel.”124 
Importantly, the court adopted the O’Shea v. Littleton test for prospective 
injunctive relief that Luckey had adopted in 1988: “the likelihood of substantial 
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”125 
The court also noted that under this test, a plaintiff need not prove actual injury 
when seeking prospective relief, but instead must only demonstrate “the 
likelihood” of the injury.126 
Equally important, the court adopted the DOJ’s standard: 
In setting forth a cause of action for prospective injunctive relief based upon 
the constructive denial of counsel, to prove the “likelihood of substantial and 
immediate irreparable injury,” the plaintiff should focus upon the following 
factors: “(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of 
representation—such as timely and confidential consultation with clients, 
appropriate investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the 
prosecution's case—are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when 
 
 120. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Kuren, 146 A.3d 715 (Nos. 57 MAP 
2015, 58 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 10768531, at *10–11. 
 121. Id. at *11. 
 122. Id. at *11–12. 
 123. Kuren, 146 A.3d at 742–43. 
 124. Id. at 743. 
 125. Id. at 744 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)); see Luckey v. Harris, 
860 F.2d 1012, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 126. Kuren, 146 A.3d at 744. 
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substantial structural limitations—such as a severe lack of resources, 
unreasonably high workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender 
offices—cause that absence or limitation on representation.”127 
The court noted that this standard offered “a workable, if non-exhaustive, 
paradigm for weighing such claims.”128 Like every court before it commenting 
on this remedy, the court noted that plaintiffs’ burden under this standard “is a 
weighty one.”129 
II.  ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE MAJOR POST-CRONIC/STRICKLAND 
SYSTEMIC CASES 
Although the Hurrell-Harring plaintiffs clearly stated their claim as a 
systemic, risk-based claim envisioned by Luckey, there is no citation to Luckey 
in that case.130 The failure of the Hurrell-Harring court to consider Luckey’s 
“likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury” standard for this 
kind of systemic claim is fatal to its analysis for a number of reasons. Without 
the benefit of Luckey’s risk-based analysis, the Hurrell-Harring court accepted 
the defendants’ definition of plaintiffs’ claim as one that was “rooted in case 
law conditioning relief for constitutionally ineffective assistance upon findings 
that attorney performance, when viewed in its total, case specific aspect, has 
both fallen below the standard of objective reasonableness and resulted in 
prejudice.”131 
On its face, that claim is not susceptible of systemic application or class 
action status, because, it is “rooted in the particular circumstances of an 
individual case,”132 and it is “contextually sensitive.”133 Given that framing of 
the issue before it, the court had little trouble finding that such a performance-
based Strickland claim “cannot serve as a predicate for systemic relief” 
because such a “highly context sensitive inquiry into the adequacy and 
particular effect of counsel’s performance cannot occur until a prosecution has 
concluded in a conviction.”134 
But the court did not want to leave the plaintiffs without a remedy for the 
horrific tales of lawyer ineptitude (nominal representation) they had pled in 
their amended class action complaint. The court noted that according to the 
 
 127. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Kuren, 146 A.3d 715 
(Nos. 57 MAP 2015, 58 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 10768531, at *11). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 745. 
 130. See generally Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010). 
 131. Id. at 220 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)) (emphasis 
added). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 225. 
 134. Id. at 220. 
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complaint, ten of the twenty plaintiffs were “altogether without representation 
at [the] arraignments” (nonrepresentation or actual denial of counsel).135 
Moreover, the plaintiffs had alleged that such actual denial of counsel was 
“illustrative of what is a fairly common practice” that included defendants 
being “unrepresented in subsequent proceedings where pleas are taken and 
other critically important legal transactions take place.”136 
In addition to those allegations of outright nonrepresentation, the 
complaint alleged that “although lawyers were eventually nominally appointed 
for plaintiffs, they were unavailable to their clients”137 in that, 
• “they conferred with them little, if at all”; 
• they “were often completely unresponsive to their [clients’] urgent 
inquiries and requests from jail, sometimes for months on end”; 
• they “waived important rights without consulting them”; 
• they “ultimately appeared to do little more on [behalf of their clients] 
than act as conduits for plea offers, some of which purportedly were 
highly unfavorable”; 
• they “missed court appearances”; 
• “when they did appear they were not prepared to proceed, often because 
they were entirely new to the case, the matters having previously been 
handled by other similarly unprepared counsel”; and 
• “the counsel [so] appointed . . . was seriously conflicted and . . . 
unqualified.”138 
Given these allegations in the complaint, the court found that “[t]he 
questions properly raised in this Sixth Amendment-grounded action, we think, 
go not to whether ineffectiveness has assumed systemic dimensions, but rather 
to whether the State has met its foundational obligation under Gideon to 
provide legal representation.”139 “These allegations,” the court found, “state a 
claim, not for ineffective assistance under Strickland, but for basic denial of 
the right to counsel under Gideon.”140 
“The basic, unadorned question presented” by these claims, the court said, 
was “whether the State has met its obligation to provide counsel, not whether 
under all the circumstances counsel’s performance was inadequate or 
 
 135. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 220. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (emphasis added). This language is what leads me to argue the Hurrell-Harring term 
“non-representation” is equivalent to actual denial of counsel and to consider the Hurrell-Harring 
term “nominal” representation as equivalent to constructive denial of counsel. 
 138. Id. at 222. 
 139. Id. at 221–22. 
 140. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224. Just in case anyone missed that point, the court 
stated later that “the complaint states a claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel by 
reason of insufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.” Id. at 225. 
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prejudicial,” noting that Strickland had held that in the former cases prejudice 
was presumed.141 
The court no doubt thought that once it had found a constructive denial 
claim in the plaintiffs’ complaint that did not require a showing of prejudice, it 
had solved the problem presented by the performance-based Strickland claim 
of actual ineffectiveness that it thought plaintiffs had pled in their pre-trial 
systemic challenge to an indigent defense system. 
The indigent defense litigation that has been conducted since the Hurrell-
Harring ruling is telling. A massive evidentiary presentation has been made in 
both New York and Florida courts, consisting of a plethora of anecdotes, 
documents, and reports, followed by expert testimony that such evidence 
should suffice to establish a denial of “the foundational obligation to provide 
counsel.”142 However, neither case provides a principled analytical standard 
that can be met with a focused evidentiary showing, nor does the proof and the 
testimony in either case address a common question of law or fact, or provide 
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.143 In Hurrell-
Harring, after seven years of litigation, a settlement on the eve of trial was 
achieved for five counties, in which the State of New York for the first time 
acknowledged its responsibility for public defense in that state and some 
additional resources were obtained, among other reforms.144 
A Florida Supreme Court decision interpreted a state statute and 
acknowledged the right of counsel with an excessive caseload to refuse 
additional cases based on the Rules of Professional Conduct, but not the Sixth 
Amendment.145 A district court in Washington state found that four lawyers in 
two small municipalities were constructively denying counsel to their clients 
and ordered monitoring and reporting to ensure reform of the practices of those 
lawyers.146 In Missouri, public defenders have established a risk-based Rules 
 
 141. Id. at 225. 
 142. Id. at 222; Pub. Def., 11th Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 
2013) (The court described the evidence: “[W]e are struck by the breadth and depth of the 
evidence of how the excessive caseload has impacted the Public Defender’s representation of 
indigent defendants.”). The author has conferred with both plaintiffs’ counsel and plaintiffs’ 
experts in Hurrell-Harring concerning the massive evidentiary presentation they were prepared to 
make had the case gone to trial. 
 143. See infra Sections III and IV. 
 144. Joel Stashenko, Judge Approves Settlement Over Indigent Criminal Defense, N.Y.L.J. 
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Judge%20Approves%20Settlement%20Over%20In 
digent%20Criminal%20Defense%20-%20NYLJ%20031815.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZ3Z-TBJW]. 
 145. Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 267, 279. 
 146. Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124, 1135–36 (W.D. Wash. 
2013). I have no doubt that a trial judge could reliably and intelligently come to that conclusion 
with respect to the performance of four lawyers in two small towns. This is what I call “the 
illusion of a lawyer.” But it is not the stuff of systemic litigation that seeks to reform large 
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of Professional Conduct claim, but not a risk-based Sixth Amendment 
claim.147 
Duncan was decided in 2009, a year before Hurrell-Harring, although it is 
not cited in Hurrell-Harring.148 Duncan, presaging the argument presented 
below, provides an “objective standard of reasonableness with respect to a 
critical stage” test for a systemic challenge to a state’s indigent defense system, 
and additionally requires a showing of “widespread and systemic” performance 
deficiencies, leaving it to the trial court how to determine that.149 While 
Duncan did cite Luckey for the proposition that the two-pronged Strickland test 
is inappropriate in a systemic case, it did not adopt Luckey’s risk-based test.150 
The recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Luzerne County, 
on the other hand, expressly adopts the risk-based Luckey standard.151 The 
decision also measurably improves upon Hurrell-Harring’s “foundational 
Gideon obligation” statement of the applicable standard for prospective 
injunctive relief in a systemic case, specifically noting that under the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s O’Shea v. Littleton test, adopted by Luckey, plaintiffs in these 
systemic cases need not prove actual injury.152 Luzerne County’s adoption of 
Luckey’s risk-based test and its more specific articulation of the constructive 
denial test are significant steps forward for this theory of recovery. 
However, even with the Luzerne County improvements to the constructive 
denial claim, we emerge from these cases with no principled analytical 
standard that can be met with a focused evidentiary showing using reliable data 
and analytics needed to certify a class and prevail on the merits in a pre-trial 
class action challenge to a state’s indigent defense system. In the following 
sections, I argue that a constructive denial claim is an insufficiently principled 
and an exorbitantly expensive vehicle for use in a large class action challenge 
to a state’s system of indigent defense. It was crafted by a court, not by 
experienced counsel. It is an entirely appropriate vehicle for individual claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, but it cannot serve as a viable claim for 
 
indigent defense systems, as has been done for decades with traditional institutional class action 
litigation in other similar systems. 
 147. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607, 612 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 148. See generally Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
 149. Id. at 123–24. 
 150. Id. at 128–29. 
 151. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 743 (Pa. 2016). 
 152. Id. at 748. The test as adopted by Luckey requires plaintiffs to show “the likelihood of 
substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.” Luckey v. 
Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 
673 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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relief in systemic Sixth Amendment challenges to state indigent defense 
systems.153 
III.  CLASS CERTIFICATION CONCERNS AFTER WAL-MART V. DUKES 
Hurrell-Harring was an appeal from an order denying a motion to 
dismiss.154 In this opinion the court did not consider the question of whether or 
not the case could be certified as a class action, but rather simply referred to 
the plaintiffs’ allegations of “broad systemic deficiencies.”155 The case was 
subsequently brought as a class action, and in a subsequent opinion, an 
intermediate appellate court reversed a trial court ruling and allowed class 
certification in this case.156 The court found the criteria in New York for class 
action status “must be liberally construed and ‘any error, if there is to be one, 
should be . . . in favor of allowing the class action.’”157 The court further noted 
that in order to prove their claim, the plaintiffs would now be “saddled with the 
enormous task of establishing that deprivations of counsel to indigent 
defendants are not simply isolated occurrences in the case of these 20 
plaintiffs, but are a common or routine happenstance in the [five upstate New 
York] counties.”158 
This favorable class certification ruling was issued on January 6, 2011.159 
A little more than five months later, on June 20, 2011, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart v. Dukes.160 The days of “liberal 
construction” of the class action rule, if they ever existed, were coming to an 
abrupt end. In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court addressed the rigorous analysis 
required to meet the commands of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.161 “The crux of this case,” Justice Scalia wrote for the Wal-Mart 
majority, “is commonality—the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class.’”162 
 
 153. As a judicial construct, a constructive denial of counsel claim exists in an individual case 
only in relation to the actual denial of counsel, and not to any higher or different standard. In 
other words, a constructive denial claim exists only when counsel’s performance in an individual 
case is so devoid of substance that it is tantamount to actual denial of counsel and therefore 
counsel’s conduct is “declared such by judicial construction or interpretation.” See supra note 18. 
This is an incredibly high bar for determining whether counsel’s conduct passes constitutional 
muster. 
 154. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219 (N.Y. 2010). 
 155. Id. at 225. 
 156. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 914 N.Y.S. 367, 369, 372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 157. Id. at 369 (citing Pruitt v. Rockefeller Ctr. Props., 574 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1991)). 
 158. Id. at 372 (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 367. 
 160. 564 U.S. 338, 338 (2011). 
 161. Id. at 345. 
 162. Id. at 349 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)). 
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Under Wal-Mart, “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”163 Their claims must 
depend on a “common contention” and that common contention “must be of 
such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”164 The Court emphasized that 
what matters in class certification is not just a common issue, but “the capacity 
of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation.”165 
The issues in the kind of “systemic” constructive denial claim created by 
the Hurrell-Harring court, we are told by that court, include: 
• whether counsel were communicative with their clients; 
• whether any such attorney-client relationship may really be said to have 
existed between many (not all) of the plaintiffs and the putative 
attorneys; 
• whether counsel made virtually no efforts on their nominal clients’ 
behalf; and 
• whether counsel waived important rights without authorization from the 
clients.166 
It is difficult to conceive of a claim that is more deeply “rooted in the 
particular circumstances of an individualized case,”167 and that will inevitably 
involve a “highly context sensitive inquiry into the adequacy and particular 
effect of counsel’s performance.”168 But that kind of individualized and 
context sensitive inquiry is simply inapposite to the post-Wal-Mart world, 
where plaintiffs seeking class certification must, as noted above, demonstrate 
that: (a) they have suffered the same injury; (b) their claims depend upon a 
common contention that is capable of classwide resolution; (c) determination 
of their claims’ truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of their claims in a single stroke; and (d) their case will 
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.169 
After Wal-Mart, it is extremely unlikely that the constructive denial claim 
described by the Hurrell-Harring court could survive the rigorous judicial 
analysis required to certify a class. The proof in such cases is a series of 
anecdotes (lawyers confer “little, if at all,” with their clients; are “completely 
 
 163. Id. at 349–50 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). 
 164. Id. at 350. 
 165. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original). 
 166. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224 (N.Y. 2010). 
 167. Id. at 220. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. 
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unresponsive to their clients’ urgent inquiries;” etc.170), together with 
voluminous documents and reports, caseload statistics, and perhaps the 1973 
NAC Standards171 and expert testimony, all of which together is claimed to 
constitute a massive evidentiary showing of a systemic violation of the 
“foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal representation,” 
whatever that may mean to any particular trial judge or reviewing court.172 
The Hurrell-Harring court’s various descriptions of the constructive denial 
claim (“a foundational obligation . . . to provide [counsel]”; “the basic denial 
of the right to counsel”; and “insufficient compliance with the constitutional 
mandate of Gideon”173) make it virtually impossible to articulate a definable 
common claim capable of judicial resolution on a class-wide basis. To 
paraphrase Justice Marshall, dissenting in Strickland, “[f]or the most part the 
[Hurrell-Harring] majority’s efforts are unhelpful” because the constructive 
denial standard is “so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at 
all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth 
Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts.”174 Or, to 
paraphrase Justice Stevens in Cronic, the Hurrell-Harring court’s creation of a 
systemic or class action constructive denial claim cannot “survive the crucible 
of meaningful adversarial testing”175 now required by Wal-Mart.176 
But what about Luzerne County’s articulation of a “totality of 
circumstances” standard for a systemic constructive denial case? 
Unfortunately, it is almost surely doomed to the same post-Wal-Mart fate. The 
court in Luzerne County adopted the DOJ’s proposed two-pronged test to 
evaluate a systemic constructive denial of counsel claim: 
(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of representation—
such as timely and confidential consultation with clients, appropriate 
investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—
are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when substantial structural 
 
 170. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222. 
 171. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: The Defense, 
NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEF. ASS’N (1973), http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/nac_standards 
forthedefense_1973.pdf [http://perma.cc/4LVU-7TT3]. 
 172. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222. 
 173. Id. at 222, 224–25. 
 174. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 175. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
 176. Wal-Mart, a case that originated in a federal district court and involved an interpretation 
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is binding law now in all federal courts and 
will undoubtedly trickle down through the state courts interpreting state class action rules similar 
or identical to Rule 23, as have most major Supreme Court class action cases interpreting Rule 
23(b)(2) regarding injunctive and declaratory relief. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345. See Duncan v. 
State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); see also Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960, 966, 
969 (La. 2011) (adoption of Wal-Mart’s commonality analysis by the Louisiana Supreme Court 
to deny class certification). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD REQUIRED TO PREVAIL 647 
limitations—such as a severe lack of resources . . . —cause that absence or 
limitation on representation.177 
Again, it is difficult to conceive of a test more deeply rooted in the 
particular circumstances of individual cases. It is extremely unlikely that such 
a claim could ever meet the “common contention” command of Rule 23(a)(2) 
in a post-Wal-Mart world. Plaintiffs manifestly have not suffered the same 
injury, their claims do not depend upon a common contention capable of class-
wide resolution, the determination of their claims’ truth or falsity will not 
resolve an issue central to the validity of each one of their claims in a single 
stroke, and their case will not generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation. Unfortunately, the claim in any constructive denial 
case, no matter how well formulated, is essentially a “totality of the 
circumstances” claim, which is simply no longer the stuff of class action 
litigation after Wal-Mart. 
Class certification cases decided since Wal-Mart make it clear that Wal-
Mart is a watershed case in class certification law. For instance, in M.D. ex rel 
Stukenberg v. Perry, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s pre-Wal-Mart 
reasoning in certifying a class of children in foster care in Texas, finding that 
the district court did not conduct the “rigorous analysis” required by Wal-Mart 
to certify a class under Rule 23(a)(2),178 and noting that Wal-Mart has “further 
defined the contours of the ‘rigorous analysis’ required by Rules 23(a) and 
23(b)(2).”179 
The district court in M.D. relied on pre-Wal-Mart law that “[t]he test for 
commonality is not demanding.”180 The Fifth Circuit rejected that notion, 
finding that “[a]lthough the district court’s analysis may have been a 
reasonable application of pre-Wal-Mart precedent, the Wal-Mart decision has 
heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), 
rendering the district court’s analysis insufficient.”181 “After Wal-Mart,” the 
Fifth Circuit observed, “Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement demands 
more than the presentation of questions that are common to the class because 
‘any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common 
questions.’”182 
 
 177. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715 
(Pa. 2016), (No. 57 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 10768531, at *11. 
 178. 675 F.3d 832, 838 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 179. Id. at 837. 
 180. Id. at 839 (alteration in original). 
 181. Id. 
 182. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter M.D.]. 
The order certifying the class in Wilbur, entered about eight months after the Supreme Court’s 
Wal-Mart decision, lists four “common questions,” and then cites Wal-Mart. However, there is 
simply no analysis of how those four “common questions” survive the rigorous analysis now 
required by Wal-Mart, other than the conclusory statement that, “The answers to most, if not all, 
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On remand in M.D., plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification 
and changed the nature of their claims substantially. In their original complaint 
plaintiffs asserted various “systemic failures” in the state’s system for the care 
of children in the care of the state.183 In response to the Fifth Circuit’s denial of 
class certification for those claims, plaintiffs proposed several subclasses and 
changed their allegations, asserting that the defendants’ policies deprived them 
of their right to be free from an unreasonable risk of harm while in the state’s 
custody.184 The district court granted class certification on the plaintiffs’ 
revised claims.185 
After Wal-Mart, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that all of the class members’ 
claims depend on a common issue of law or fact whose resolution “will resolve 
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the [class member’s] 
claims in one stroke.”186 The variety of the individual indigent defendant’s 
complaints about their individual lawyer’s performances set out by the 
Hurrell-Harring court cannot pass this test in a post-Wal-Mart world. Simply 
characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim as one asserting “systemic deficiencies,” as 
the court did in Hurrell-Harring,187 will no longer suffice to meet the “rigorous 
analysis” required for class certification under Rule 23(a)(2) after Wal-Mart. 
IV.  A RISK-BASED CLAIM FOR SYSTEMIC SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
My central argument in this article is that in order to prevail on a pre-trial 
claim asserting systemic Sixth Amendment violations and seeking systemic 
prospective injunctive relief, courts should require plaintiffs to prove that there 
is a significant likelihood (or risk) of substantial and immediate injury to the 
class—that is, prejudice, at both plea188 and trial189—because the defendants 
lack the capacity to provide to the class reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel under prevailing professional norms at all critical stages of the 
 
of these questions will be capable of classwide resolution.” Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 298 
F.R.D. 665, 667 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
 183. M.D., 675 F.3d at 835. 
 184. Id. This is precisely the risk-based kind of claim I argue for in Section IV below. 
 185. M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 66 (S.D. Tex. 2013). The Fifth Circuit dismissed the State’s 
Rule 23(f) petition to appeal the class certification order as untimely in an unpublished order. 
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 547 Fed. Appx. 543, 544 (2013). The author wishes to thank 
Mario H. Nguyen, Harvard Law School, J.D. Candidate 2017 for pointing out this development in 
M.D. to me after a lecture I gave to his class recently. 
 186. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
 187. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 225 (N.Y. 2010). 
 188. “A reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been 
more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.” Missouri 
v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012). 
 189. “[A] reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s professional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1983). 
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proceeding.190 There is no requirement to show actual prejudice.191 This is 
what I call a risk-based claim asserting systemic Sixth Amendment violations, 
as opposed to the performance-based claim of actual ineffectiveness asserted 
by the plaintiffs in Luckey and appropriately rejected by that court. 
Stated more succinctly, I argue that the appropriate test for a class action 
systemic challenge to an indigent defense system is simply this: a significant 
risk of prejudice due to systemic inability to perform. The Luckey court 
rejected performance-based claims of actual ineffectiveness for pre-trial class 
action claims seeking prospective injunctive relief and presaged the kind of 
risk-based pre-trial class action claim for systemic Sixth Amendment 
violations that I describe here.192 
A risk-based claim differs significantly from a performance-based claim. 
The best example of a risk-based class action claim that I know of is Gates v. 
Cook.193 In Gates, death row prisoners at Mississippi’s infamous Parchman 
Farm (Mississippi State Penitentiary) brought a class action complaining that 
horrific conditions of confinement posed intolerable risks to their health, 
including the risk of serious heat-related injury or death during the scorching 
summers in the Mississippi Delta, when the Heat Index in death row cells 
sometimes exceeded 130º F.194 The inmates claimed that those conditions 
violated the Eighth Amendment.195 
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they show deliberate 
indifference to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to the 
 
 190. Frye, 566 U.S. at 140. 
 191. There is also a requirement to prove that any remedies at law are inadequate, but the 
courts after Luckey considering Sixth Amendment challenges in systemic cases have little trouble 
finding that individual post-trial motions to set aside individual convictions are an inadequate 
remedy at law for systemic deficiencies. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 
1122, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
 192. Duncan similarly articulated such a test: i.e., plaintiffs must show that counsel’s 
performance “falls below an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to a critical stage 
in the proceedings.” Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 123 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). The court 
added that plaintiffs must show that such performance deficiencies are “widespread and 
systemic.” Id. The Duncan court also noted: “[S]imply being deprived of the constitutional right 
to effective representation at a critical stage in the proceedings, in and of itself, gives rise to 
harm.” Id. at 127. It is tempting to substitute the risk of ineffectiveness at a critical stage for the 
risk of prejudice that I am proposing here, but there are several reasons not to do so. First, I think 
such a standard involves far more factual and legal complexity than prejudice. Second, the odds 
are against that standard’s surviving a post-Wal-Mart class certification analysis. Third, we need 
not employ that standard since we can now convincingly prove the risk of prejudice with reliable 
data and analytics. Finally, there is good reason to believe that the courts will be much more 
receptive to a risk of prejudice standard. 
 193. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004). The author served as co-counsel for 
plaintiffs on this case. 
 194. Id. at 327. 
 195. Id. 
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inmate by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.196 In Gates, we 
amply met our burden of proving deliberate indifference by showing that the 
risk to health from excessive heat was so obvious that prison officials must 
have been actually aware of the risks, yet failed to take reasonable measures in 
response.197 
The state argued that we had not and could not show a substantial risk of 
serious harm because there was no proof that any death row inmate at 
Parchman had ever died or suffered serious injury from excessive heat.198 And 
indeed, the record supported that contention. But our medical expert 
persuasively testified that it was “very likely” that, under the conditions then 
existing on Death Row, an inmate would die or suffer serious injury from heat 
stroke or some other heat related illness due to excessive heat in the cells.199 
Importantly for our purposes here, the Fifth Circuit held that an inmate 
need not show that death or serious illness from heat exposure has occurred in 
order to prevail.200 “It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who 
plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the 
ground that nothing yet had happened to them.”201 All that the inmates need to 
show is that the conditions pose a substantial risk of serious harm.202 
Similarly, here, in order to prevail in a class action case asserting a 
systemic risk-based Sixth Amendment claim and seeking prospective 
injunctive relief, plaintiffs need only prove that there is a likelihood (or risk) of 
substantial and immediate injury to the class. In this risk-based claim, that risk 
is prejudice due to systematic inability to provide reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms to the class. 
There is no requirement to show actual prejudice. 
But will the kind of risk-based claim that I argue for here stand up under 
critical analysis? We return to Missouri to begin that analysis. As noted above, 
in Waters, the Missouri Supreme Court sustained the public defender’s claim 
for denial of reasonably effective assistance of counsel, but did not adopt the 
 
 196. Id. at 333 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994)). 
 197. Id. at 335. 
 198. Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 16, Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(No. 03-60529), 2003 WL 23783285, at *16. 
 199. Gates, 376 F.3d at 339. The expert also testified that the inmates had complained of 
symptoms commonly recognized to be related to heat-related illnesses, but that these symptoms 
had simply gone undiagnosed. Id. Sound familiar? 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 333 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). Luzerne County 
similarly held that under the O’Shea v. Littleton test adopted by Luckey, when seeking 
prospective relief, a plaintiff need not prove actual injury. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 
748 (Pa. 2016). See also M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 45 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 202. Gates, 376 F.3d at 339. 
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risk-based Luckey analysis that the public defender urged.203 The court also 
sustained the public defender’s risk-based Rules of Professional Conduct claim 
that excessive caseloads produced concurrent conflict under Rule 1.7 (“a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client”).204 The court also 
found no infirmity in the public defender’s duly promulgated rule and protocol 
for case refusal.205 
The Waters decision was issued on July 31, 2012.206 The Missouri Public 
Defender immediately began to refuse additional appointments pursuant to its 
duly promulgated rule.207 However, in October 2012, Missouri State Auditor 
Thomas A. Schweich, in a routine audit of the Missouri Public Defender, 
rejected the public defender’s caseload protocol which had been upheld in 
Waters as part of a presumptively valid rule.208 The Missouri State Auditor 
held the rule did not have sufficient support since the rule was based 
substantially on caseload numbers recommended by the 1973 National 
Advisory Commission that were not evidence based.209 The Missouri Public 
Defender then stopped implementing its case refusal rule and protocol.210 
National indigent defense expert Norman Lefstein, in his Executive Summary 
and Recommendations: Securing Reasonable Caseloads, specifically 
recommended that henceforth public defenders “should not rely upon” the 
1973 NAC Standards.211 
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants 
(SCLAID) then retained Rubin Brown, one of the nation’s leading accounting 
and professional consulting firms, to perform a rigorous analysis of the 
workload of the Missouri Public Defender using the Delphi method that had 
been introduced by researchers at the Rand Corporation in 1962.212 The Delphi 
 
 203. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 204. Id. at 607. 
 205. Id. at 612. 
 206. Id. at 592. 
 207. Missouri State Auditor Report, MO. PUB. DEF. SYS. 7 (2012), http://app.auditor.mo.gov/ 
repository/press/2012-129.pdf [http://perma.cc/2U7W-UTK5]. 
 208. Id. at 11. 
 209. Id. at 14. 
 210. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEF. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2015), 
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/about/FY2015AnnualReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/222B-AX 
RM]. 
 211. Norman Lefstein, Executive Summary and Recommendations: Securing Reasonable 
Caseloads, A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 34 (2012), 
http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2011_LefsteinExecSummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/NF3Q-M6 
YK]. 
 212. RUBIN BROWN LLP, THE MISSOURI PROJECT REPORT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI 
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 5 (2014), http://www.a 
mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_ 
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method has been peer reviewed and found to be an effective tool for producing 
a reliable consensus of expert opinion. As applied to the workload of a public 
defender, the Delphi method asks both experienced public defenders and 
experienced private criminal defense attorneys to provide a consensus estimate 
of the amount of time defense counsel should expect to spend on each 
designated Case Task in each of the designated Case Types in order to provide 
reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional 
norms.213 
The Missouri Project Report was published in February of 2014.214 The 
Missouri Project Report has been described as a “watershed moment” for 
indigent defense.215 Upon the release of the report, ABA President James 
Silkenat stated, “It can now be more reliably demonstrated than ever before 
that for decades the American legal profession has been rendering an enormous 
disservice to indigent clients and to the criminal justice system in a way that 
can no longer be tolerated.”216 A similar workload study using the Delphi 
method was completed in Texas in 2015 and four more workload studies are 
being conducted in Louisiana, Tennessee, Colorado, and Rhode Island, with 
similar studies under consideration in other states.217 
The most pertinent results of The Missouri Project Report are the vast 
discrepancies between the actual time worked by public defenders (determined 
from analyses of the timekeeping data generated by these public defenders) 
and the time determined by the expert Delphi panels (experienced criminal 
defenders, both private and public) required to provide reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms.218 This table 
 
missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/QSP8-5CEQ] [hereinafter Missouri 
Project Report]. The Delphi method has been peer reviewed and found to be a reliable tool for 
producing a reliable consensus of expert opinion. Id. at 17. The Missouri Public Defender used 
the Missouri Project Report to obtain its largest increase in funding in fifteen years from a two-
thirds Republican Legislature, and when the Democratic Governor vetoed that bill, the 
Legislature overrode that veto—three times—and the Democratic Governor then impounded the 
funds—three times. Letter from Michael Barrett to Governor Jay Nixon (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/Newsfeed/Delegation_of_Representation.PDF [http://perma. 
cc/KQY2-LTBQ]. 
 213. Missouri Project Report, supra note 212, at 19. 
 214. Id. at 2. 
 215. Andrew Davies, How Do We “Do Data” in Public Defense?, 78 ALBANY L. REV. 1179, 
1179–92 (2015). 
 216. National Association for Public Defense, Letter to Chairman Grassley and Senator 
Leahy (May 19, 2015), http://www.publicdefenders.us/files/Letter_to_Chairman_Grassley_and_ 
Senator_Leahy_May%2019%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VG4-4VYU]. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Missouri Project Report, supra note 212, at 6. 
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demonstrates some of the most notable findings from the Missouri Project 
Report219: 
CASE TYPE ACTUAL TIME CONSENSUS EXPERT TIME 
Misdemeanor 2.3 11.7 
A/B Felony 8.7 47.6 
C/D Felony  4.4 25.0 
Sex Felony 25.6 63.8 
The results for the remaining four Case Types (all eight Case Types have 
fourteen Case Tasks each) are similarly stark.220 The published results from the 
Texas study and the preliminary results from the other studies now being 
conducted are also similarly stark.221 The consequences for both legislative 
advocacy for additional funding and judicial intervention in the event that 
funding is not forthcoming are both obvious and remarkable. 
The Missouri Project Report provides the factual predicate for a risk-based 
claim for systemic Sixth Amendment violations. The principal question 
presented to the Delphi panel of experienced experts is, for each Case Task in 
each Case Type: how much time is reasonably required in order to provide 
reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional 
norms?222 
The expert panel of experienced criminal practitioners in the Delphi study 
are presented with the applicable law and standards for the study to guide their 
professional judgment about the amount of time that is reasonably required to 
provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing 
professional norms, much in the way a jury is presented with instructions to 
guide their judgment. As noted above, Strickland cited the prevailing 
professional norms reflected in the CJS Defense Function Standards as “guides 
to determining what is reasonable,” specifically disclaiming any “particular set 
of detailed rules” as appropriate for this task and ultimately endorsing the 
“reasonably effective assistance” standard.223 A quarter century later in Padilla 
v. Kentucky the Supreme Court reiterated that “prevailing norms of practice as 
reflected in American Bar Association Standards” are not only “guides to 
determining what is reasonable,” but also “valuable measures of the prevailing 
professional norms of effective representation.”224 
 
 219. Id. at 23–24. 
 220. Id. at 23–26. 
 221. Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Guidelines for Indigent Defense Caseloads (Jan. 
2015), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/150122_weightedcl_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/PZ 
3S-KCDM]. 
 222. Missouri Project Report, supra note 212, at 11. 
 223. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 224. 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010). 
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Notably, in Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court found that “ninety-four 
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas,” citing Department of 
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics.225 The court quoted a Yale Law Journal 
article approvingly: “[P]lea bargaining . . . is not some adjunct to the criminal 
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”226 
For that reason, the experts on the Delphi panel are advised by the ABA 
Project Leader of that Supreme Court finding along with the ABA’s Criminal 
Justice Section Defense Function Standard 4-6.1(b), which sets out the 
prevailing professional norm for defense counsel’s duty to explore disposition 
without trial (plea).227 That standard provides that “in every criminal matter, 
defense counsel should consider the individual circumstances of the case and 
of the client, and should not recommend acceptance of a plea to a client unless 
and until appropriate investigation and study of the matter has been 
completed,” including: 
• Discussion with the client; 
• An analysis of relevant law; 
• An analysis of the prosecutor’s evidence; 
• An analysis of potential dispositions; and 
• An analysis of relevant collateral consequences.228 
In Louisiana, for example, such a workload study has been conducted by 
the ABA and Postlethwaite & Netterville (P&N), Louisiana’s largest public 
accounting firm.229 From this study, the Louisiana Project report was co-issued 
by the ABA and P&N on February 17, 2017.230 The conclusion of the 
Louisiana Project report is nothing less than stunning: 
At this workload, and to be in compliance with the Delphi panel’s consensus 
opinions, 3,679,792 hours (approximately 1,769 public defenders are required 
to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing 
 
 225. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
 226. Id. (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stunz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original). 
 227. ABA’s Criminal Justice Section Defense Function, Standard 4-6.1(b) (1991). 
 228. Id. This protocol, including utilization of CJS Defense Function Standard 4-6.1(b), is 
now being employed in ABA Delphi studies in Louisiana, Colorado, Tennessee, and Rhode 
Island; was employed in Missouri and Texas; and will be employed in all such future workload 
studies. 
 229. Louisiana Public Defender Board, Memorandum to Public Defenders on Workload Study 
and Statewide Case Refusal Motions, 1–2 (Mar. 18, 2016), http://lpdb.la.gov/Serving%20The%20 
Public/News/txtfiles/pdf/LPDB%20Memo%20to%20Defenders_3_18_2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
9PU2-4SJG]. 
 230. See The Louisiana Project: A Study of the Louisiana Defender System and Attorney 
Workload Standards, POSTLETHWAITE & NETTERVILLE and THE A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE 
ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (Feb. 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/images/abanews/LouisianaProjectReportFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/HRE9-Q4B3]. 
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professional norms in Louisiana to meet the annual public defense workloads 
for these Case Types. As of October 31, 2016, the Louisiana public defense 
system employed approximately 363 FTE public defenders. Therefore, the 
Delphi method’s process indicates the Louisiana public defense system is 
currently deficient 1,406 FTE attorneys. Alternatively, based on the Delphi 
Method’s results and analysis presented herein, the Louisiana public defense 
system only has the capacity to handle 21 percent of the workload in 
compliance with the Delphi panel’s consensus opinions.231 
Louisiana public defenders, armed with the results of the ABA/P&N 
workload study, now have compelling evidence and reliable data and analytics 
to establish that there is a significant likelihood (or risk) of substantial and 
immediate injury to their clients—that is, prejudice, at both plea and trial232—
because they are systematically unable to provide reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel under prevailing professional norms, in that they have 
only 21% of the lawyers that needed to do that.233 Of course, a class of the 
public defenders’ clients will now have that same reliable data and analytics 
available from this public report to serve as the factual predicate for any class 
action claim asserting a risk-based claim for systemic Sixth Amendment 
violations against the Louisiana Public Defender Board, on whose behalf the 
study was undertaken.234 
Moreover, this risk-based claim for systemic Sixth Amendment 
violations—significant risk of prejudice due to systemic inability to perform—
supported by this reliable data and analytics, will readily withstand the 
“rigorous analysis” now required to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 
23(a)(2) for class certification in a post-Wal-Mart world,235 because: 
• Plaintiffs have suffered the same injury: significant risk of prejudice; 
• Plaintiffs’ claims depend on a “common contention” that is of such a 
nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution: based on the results of 
the ABA/P&N workload study, the entire class can show they are and 
will be represented by public defenders who are handing almost five 
times more cases than they should, and who are therefore incapable of 
providing reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to 
prevailing professional norms to each member of the class;236 and 
• This class-wide proceeding has the capacity to generate common 
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation: an order that is the 
 
 231. Id. at 2. 
 232. See supra notes 188 and 189. 
 233. The Louisiana Project, supra note 230, at 2. 
 234. Id. at Preface. 
 235. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 250 (2011). See also M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 
29 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 236. See The Louisiana Project, supra note 230, at 3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
656 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:625 
functional equivalent of a permanent structural injunction directing each 
public defender to decline further appointments until their workload is 
no more than their capacity to provide reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms, as determined by the 
ABA/P&N workload study.237 
Louisiana Public Defenders will also have available reliable data and 
analytics to demonstrate that they cannot continue to accept the grossly 
unreasonable workloads that they are currently carrying because to continue to 
do so creates a “significant risk” that the representation of one or more of their 
clients will be materially limited by that lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client, in violation of Rule 1.7 of the ABA and Louisiana Rules of Professional 
Conduct.238 
There is also a compelling risk-based Holloway v. Arkansas239 right to 
conflict-free counsel claim that can constitutionalize the Rule 1.7 claim. The 
ABA/P&N study will demonstrate that because of their excessive workloads 
each public defender’s representation of any one client is in fact materially 
limited by their representation of their other clients, and vice versa. Each of 
their clients is entitled to conflict-free counsel under Holloway and its progeny, 
and none of their clients have such concurrent conflict-free counsel under Rule 
1.7. Thus, there is a significant risk that each public defender’s concurrent 
conflict will significantly affect their performance, resulting in prejudice, at 
both plea240 and trial.241 
Note that all three claims involve risk analyses: significant risk of 
concurrent conflict in the Rules of Professional Conduct claim; significant risk 
of prejudice in the conflict-free counsel claim and significant risk of prejudice 
and the Sixth Amendment claim. None of these three risk-based claims require 
proof of actual harm or injury; i.e., prejudice. 
The proof in this kind of rigorously analytical and structured risk-based 
claim differs dramatically from the proof presented in the traditional 
constructive denial case. The proof in each of the three risk-based claims 
articulated here will focus on the ABA/P&N workload study, supported by 
expert testimony from both a law and standards expert (ABA) and an 
econometrics expert (P&N) about the validity, reliability, process and results 
of the study. If the court accepts the expert testimony that the workload study 
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is valid and reliable, little else remains to be shown in order to prevail on the 
risk-based Rule 1.7 claim, the risk-based conflict-free counsel claim and the 
risk-based Sixth Amendment claim.242 
That is so because it is virtually self-evident that any professional—doctor, 
lawyer, engineer, architect, airline pilot, etc. who is doing almost five times as 
much work as he or she should—is simply incapable of providing reasonably 
effective professional services under prevailing professional norms to each of 
their clients or patients or passengers, and therefore there is a significant risk of 
harm to every one of their clients or patients or passengers. If airline pilots did 
that, terrible things would happen. If obstetricians did that, terrible things 
would happen. When public defenders do that, terrible things happen. 
In short, when public defenders have workloads that are almost five times 
their capacity to handle competently, there is a significant risk that: (a) the 
representation of every one of their clients will be materially limited by their 
responsibilities to every one of their other clients (systemic Rule 1.7 violation); 
(b) their Rule 1.7 concurrent conflict will result in prejudice in both cases that 
end in pleas and those that end in trials243 (systemic Holloway v. Arkansas 
violation); and (c) their systemic inability to perform will result in prejudice in 
both cases that end in pleas and those that end in trials244 (systemic Sixth 
Amendment violation). 
These Rule 1.7, Holloway, and Sixth Amendment claims exist in systemic 
cases even though one or more such public defenders may, from time to time, 
by triaging their cases and pushing resources to one or more of their cases, 
provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing 
professional norms to one or more of their clients. That is so because such 
triaging is unethical and unconstitutional under Rule 1.7, Holloway, and the 
Sixth Amendment. When public defenders have workloads that are almost five 
times their capacity to handle competently, each one of them is unavoidably 
acting unethically and unconstitutionally at all times and at every moment of 
the day because of their unethical Rule 1.7 concurrent conflicts with every one 
of their clients and their resulting inability to provide conflict-free and 
reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional 
norms to each one of their clients. 
The relief requested in a case refusal case (as well as a class action case 
asserting a risk-based claim of systemic Sixth Amendment violations) is 
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simple and straightforward. The court is requested to enter an order permitting 
(or requiring in the class action case) each public defender involved to decline 
appointments in any case until, utilizing the analytics referred to above, each 
public defender’s workload is no greater than their capacity to handle 
competently.245 Regular reports of each public defender’s workload are to be 
filed with the court every thirty days, and the court will review each public 
defender’s workload to ensure that each public defender’s workload is no 
greater than his or her capacity to handle competently before making 
appointments. In the event no public defender or other competent lawyer is 
available to represent any one or more indigent defendants on the court’s 
docket, the case against such an indigent defendant should be dismissed, and if 
the defendant is in custody, he or she should be released. The court should 
retain jurisdiction of the case to enforce its order. 
The state will then have the opportunity to choose what it wishes to do 
with the limited resources it is now providing for public defense. Until the state 
decides whether it wishes to provide more lawyers and investigators (supply-
side solution) or to decriminalize current criminal code provisions that have no 
public safety consequences246 (demand-side solution), or both, judges will 
necessarily have to prioritize cases on their dockets, exercising their inherent 
power to control their dockets, by assigning counsel to the highest priority, 
high risk cases, and dismissing those lower risk, lower priority cases where 
competent and effective counsel cannot be found.247 Those defendants in 
custody in such cases must be released. 
Our clients (public defenders in case refusal litigation, indigent defendants 
in class action cases) are entitled to judicial relief long before the system 
deteriorates all the way down to constructive denial of counsel (“nominal 
representation”), with lawyers who confer little, if at all, with them, and who 
are “often completely unresponsive to their urgent inquiries and requests from 
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jail, sometimes for months on end,” two of the most egregious of the parade of 
horribles detailed by the court in Hurrell-Harring.248 
The American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in Luzerne County 
asking the court to recognize a cause of action where public defender 
workloads and lack of funding prevent indigent defendants from receiving the 
“actual, non-trivial representation that Gideon demands.”249 Actual, non-trivial 
representation is a long way from reasonably effective assistance of counsel 
under prevailing professional norms. While this brief may have more 
accurately described the constructive denial standard than anyone else, that is 
not the standard that anyone, particularly this class of exclusively poor, 
primarily black and brown people, deserves. 
Let me put it another way. If “ideal” is one hundred and “reasonably 
effective” is sixty and “constructive denial” is ten and “actual denial” is zero, 
why would we ever say that our clients are not entitled to any judicial relief 
until and unless we can prove that the system has deteriorated all the way 
down to ten? Why wouldn’t we say that our clients are entitled to judicial relief 
once the system dips below sixty? And if we give the courts the choice, which 
number do you think they will pick? 
V.  DISMISS AND RELEASE: THE BROWN V. PLATA ANALOG 
Recently in Louisiana, a trial court issued a “dismiss and release” order in 
a case involving denial of counsel altogether, staying its order pending 
appeal.250 The stay order was probably a wise and prudent decision, and such a 
stay order would probably be a wise and prudent decision if a similar dismiss 
and release order were issued in the risk-based class action Sixth Amendment 
claim I have articulated in this article. But we should never disavow a “dismiss 
and release” order simply because our opponents are sure to claim that the sky 
will fall (“Dangerous criminals will be released onto our streets!”) if we 
conform our conduct to the commands of the Constitution. 
Such an argument fell on deaf ears in the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Plata, the California statewide class action claim based on overcrowding in the 
California prison system.251 The case started in 1990 as a claim on behalf of 
 
 248. 930 N.E.2d 217, 222 (N.Y. 2010). 
 249. Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curie Supporting Appellants at 2, Kuren 
v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016) (No. 57 MAP 2015, No. 58 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 
10818715, at *1. 
 250. State v. Bernard, No. 528-021, at *11 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Orl., Sec. K, Apr. 8, 2016). 
The court found that the absence of a date certain as to when adequate funding would be made 
available by the legislature for constitutionally mandated representation of defendants who cannot 
afford an attorney violates the Sixth Amendment. Subject to the stay order, the prosecutions were 
to be halted and the defendants were to be released immediately, but the charges were not 
dropped. Id. 
 251. 563 U.S. 493, 501–02 (2011). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
660 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:625 
prisoners with serious mental illness who were not receiving minimally 
adequate mental health care.252 But in 2007, a Special Master appointed to 
oversee the state’s remedial efforts first reported to the court that mental health 
care in the California prisons was deteriorating due to increased 
overcrowding.253 A remedial consent decree was entered, but when the state 
had not complied with the decree by 2005, the court appointed a receiver to 
oversee remedial efforts to reduce overcrowding.254 
A three-judge court then ordered the state of California to reduce its 
population to 137.5% of capacity within two years.255 California prisons were 
operating at approximately 200% at the time of the decision.256 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the three judge court’s mandated population limit and found 
that it was necessary to remedy the violation of the prisoner’s constitutional 
rights to protection from harm under the Eighth Amendment, finding that 
overcrowding was the primary, but not the only, cause of the violations and 
that no other relief would remedy the violation.257 Of course, the state claimed 
the “the sky would fall” if the order were effectuated and that public safety 
would be imperiled.258 
That claim was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court, which found that 
the three judge panel had correctly considered various available methods of 
reducing overcrowding—good time credits and diverting low-risk offenders to 
community programs—that would have little or no effect on public safety.259 
The state was given two years to comply with the order.260 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Plata majority, could not have been clearer about the remedy 
required to cure the constitutional violation: “This extensive and ongoing 
constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved 
without a reduction in overcrowding. The relief ordered by the three-judge 
court is required by the Constitution . . . . The State shall implement the order 
without further delay.”261 
The systemic Rule 1.7, conflict-free counsel, and Sixth Amendment claims 
articulated here deserve a remedy closely analogous to the Plata remedy. This 
kind of injunctive remedy was first articulated by the Missouri Supreme Court 
in Waters where the court approved case refusal as a remedy when public 
defenders have so many cases that they cannot represent each of their clients 
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competently and effectively.262 When that occurs, the court noted, trial judges 
should prioritize cases on their dockets in the interest of public safety, so that 
the most serious cases are assigned to public defenders, and if no competent 
public defender can be found to represent those charged with less serious 
crimes, those cases should be dismissed, and if the defendants in such cases are 
in custody, they should be released.263 
The Plata overcrowding claim was first brought to the attention of the 
court in 2001.264 In 2009, a three-judge court gave the State of California two 
years to reduce its prison population from 200% of design capacity to 137.5% 
of design capacity.265 In the interim, the State of California “made significant 
progress toward reducing its prison population.”266 In 2010, the Supreme Court 
gave the State of California two years from the date the court issued its 
judgment to comply with that order.267 That timeline is probably a reasonable 
expectation for a risk-based claim that asserts a systemic Sixth Amendment 
violation. 
CONCLUSION 
In his new book, “Louis D. Brandeis, American Prophet,” Jeffrey Rosen 
traces the evolution of Justice Brandeis’ thought over several decades on the 
vexing issue of freedom of thought and belief and dissent in a free society.268 
Rosen recounts a conversation between Justice Brandeis and Justice Felix 
Frankfurter in 1921 in which Brandeis told Frankfurter: “I have never been 
quite happy about my concurrence in [the] Debs and Schenck cases. I had not 
then thought the issues of freedom of speech out—I thought at the subject, not 
through it.”269 
A compelling argument can be made, it seems to me, that for the last 
quarter century of the twentieth century and the first sixteen years of the 
twenty-first century, those of us who have labored in the vineyards of systemic 
indigent defense reform—myself included—have thought at the subject of how 
to structure the litigation we were bringing, but we have not thought through it. 
We have litigated indigent defense cases with little more than a series of 
anecdotes, miscellaneous documents, reports about “systemic” deficiencies and 
expert testimony that had little more than the wholly unreliable 1973 NAC 
 
 262. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 612 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 263. Id. at 611–12. 
 264. Plata, 563 U.S. at 507. 
 265. Id. at 502, 510, 542. 
 266. Id. at 544. 
 267. Id. at 542. 
 268. See JEFFERY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, AMERICAN PROPHET (Yale Univ. Press 
2016). 
 269. Id. at 126 (alteration in original). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
662 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:625 
Standards for a factual predicate and no principled analytical legal standard. If 
we are honest with ourselves, we will acknowledge that these claims have been 
structured by the judiciary, and not by us. 
I argue in this article that we now have three viable jurisprudential 
predicates: a risk-based systemic professional ethics claim, a risk-based 
systemic conflict-free counsel claim, and a risk-based systemic Sixth 
Amendment claim. Moreover, we now have a viable factual predicate—
reliable data and analytics to analyze the workload of a public defender 
organization. We can now establish both constitutional and professional ethics 
systemic indigent defense claims with principled analytic standards that can be 
met with a focused evidentiary showing using reliable data and analytics. 
We might look to the death penalty community of lawyers for guidance. 
This community of lawyers has produced a remarkable reduction in the 
number of death penalties actually meted out since the terrible loss in Gregg v. 
Georgia.270 Indeed, many now believe that the end of this ignominious 
institution is in sight and that a turning point in those efforts occurred during 
the period 2000 to 2005 with the Supreme Court victories in Rompilla v. 
Beard,271 Wiggins v. Smith,272 and Williams v. Taylor.273 
All three cases relied on the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and the CJS 
Standards for the Defense Function.274 All three cases imposed heavy financial 
burdens on the state to adequately fund mitigation investigation and 
litigation.275 The result was twofold: first, it would cost the state a great deal 
more money to litigate death penalty cases; second, once they were adequately 
funded with the enormous investigation and litigation resources required for 
adequate mitigation in each and every one of these cases, the death penalty 
lawyers were successful in a much greater percentage of these cases. It turns 
out that if we are adequately funded, we can mitigate almost anyone. 
Prosecutors hate to lose cases. Cities and counties hate to spend huge sums of 
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money on risky death penalty litigation. We are killing a lot fewer people than 
we used to.276 
The litigation strategy that I propose here is similar in many respects to 
that death penalty litigation strategy. It is based on the remarkable work done 
by Norman Lefstein277 and the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants with the issuance of the Ten Principles of a Public 
Defense System in 2002 (specifically Principle 5 regarding excessive 
workloads),278 the issuance of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility’s Formal Opinion that public defenders faced with 
excessive workloads must not accept new clients,279 and issuance of the Eight 
Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads in 2009 which 
provided a detailed action plan for declining representation in the face of 
excessive workloads.280 The Waters court specifically relied on the Eight 
Guidelines in concluding that public defenders have the right (and the duty) to 
refuse additional appointments when faced with excessive workloads.281 
By establishing the right and duty to refuse additional cases unless and 
until we are adequately funded to provide reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel under prevailing professional norms, the cost to the state of its 
stubbornly continuing the criminalization of poverty, the criminalization of 
homelessness, the criminalization of drug addiction, and the criminalization of 
mental illness that has occurred in the last thirty years will be dramatically 
increased. And like our death penalty brethren, we will undoubtedly prevail in 
many more of our cases once we are adequately funded. And we will start 
getting better deals from our prosecutor friends. 
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Constructive denial of counsel claims, even if successful, turn these 
principles on their heads. We, not the state, must spend huge sums of money 
and enormous amounts of time to establish our claim. Risk-based claims for 
systemic Sixth Amendment violations, on the other hand, when successful, 
require the state to lower caseloads,282 which means states must either spend 
huge sums of money (supply-side solution with many more lawyers and 
investigators) or significantly shrink the system (demand-side solution 
decriminalizing the lower-risk cases in the system). 
My critique of the constructive denial of counsel claim in this article 
should in no way be read as a criticism of the lawyers, experts, and others who 
have engaged in the overwhelmingly arduous and costly work required to 
achieve reform under that standard. Those efforts were extraordinary, 
laudatory, and conducted in the highest and best traditions of our profession. 
And in fairness to them, as I show above, they first brought a risk-based claim 
for systemic Sixth Amendment violations to the courts, only to have the courts 
misconstrue that claim as a performance-based claim and then restate that 
claim as a systemic claim for constructive denial.283 I simply argue here that 
there is a better, more focused, more principled, and more powerful way 
forward, employing a principled analytical standard that can be met with a 
focused evidentiary showing using reliable data and analytics. 
One final caveat. Conceivably, some courts may be tempted to view the 
risk-based Sixth Amendment claim that I have articulated here as the same 
kind of performance-based claim appropriately rejected by the Luckey court for 
a systemic pre-trial Sixth Amendment challenge to an indigent defense system. 
This is because I posit here that the appropriate test in such a challenge is a 
significant risk of prejudice due to a systemic inability to perform, and courts 
are accustomed to treating the prejudice standard as an essential part of a 
performance-based individual post-conviction claim. However, I have faith 
that the courts will understand that proving prejudice after conviction is 
fundamentally different from proving a significant risk of prejudice to a 
defendant pretrial. In short, I believe that the courts, and hopefully the rest of 
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